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Public Private Partnerships (PPP) matter as a way of delivering public services, because there are
so many pressures driving public authorities to use them across different sectors and Member
States. They are often complex transactions, leading to long, high-value contracts, in high-
profile sectors, so the opportunities and risks are correspondingly greater than in other public
procurements. And, because they are relatively new, there is a need to ensure that the way they
are carried out and their impact over time on public service delivery are watched very closely.
It is also important to make sure that they are not adversely affected in future by legal uncertainty,
even though this has not been a major barrier so far. After analysing the risks and challenges,
this article goes on to propose how PPP can be used more effectively and how the potential legal
uncertainty can be reduced, thus helping to ensure that PPP remains a viable option for public
service delivery in the EU, Accession States and Candidate Countries.
Beyond the New Public
Procurement Directive –
the Future for Public Private
Partnerships (PPP)
By Michael Burnett, Lecturer – EIPA Maastricht
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Why do PPP matter?
In November 2005 the European Commission published a
Communication on the future treatment of Public Private
Partnerships (PPP) and concessions in EU law.1 But PPP should
in any event already be on the agenda of policy makers and
those responsible for public service delivery in the EU.
PPP are complex transactions. They are often high-value
contracts for public services and necessitate a lengthy
selection process. So the opportunities and risks for public
entities are correspondingly greater in PPP than they are for
other public contracts. It is important to know when they are
the right solution, to make the right operational and
commercial decisions when implementing them and to
have the legal certainty necessary to attract competition for
the role of private partner. PPP are becoming more widely
used but few PPP have gone the full course of their life in the
sense that they have completed all of their design, con-
struction and operational phases. So, in a wider context
there is a need now to try to understand the medium and
long term political and economic effects of PPP as a means
of public service delivery.
This article aims to explain what PPP are, why it is now
important to understand when and how to use them, and
some of the issues affecting how they can be used more
effectively.
What are PPP?
PPP has become a widely-used term to describe different
types of contractual arrangements. It is a term characterised
by a lot of acronyms and titles.2 But, as the International
Monetary Fund has recognised,3 there is no clear agreement
on what constitutes a PPP.
PPP are thus best described by the typical features of a
such a transaction. These can be summarised as follows:
• the creation and/or re-development of an asset by a
private sector supplier. This can, for example, be a road,
a bridge, a school or a hospital, normally using land
and/or buildings which were publicly owned before the
PPP;
• the  use by the same private sector supplier of the asset
created or re-developed to provide a new or existing
service to the public over a defined period of time. This
period is often longer (up to 30 years or more) than is
customary in other public contracts;
• the payment of a periodic charge by the public entity to
the supplier for the provision of the service using the
asset. The periodic charge may vary according to the
volume of service supplied;
• the absence of a commitment by the public entity to pay
the periodic charge until and unless the asset is used in
the provision of the service;
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ve • the sharing of the risks and rewards of the outcome of
the project by both partners.
This list of features captures the essence of PPP, namely
that they are about partnership between the public and
private sectors to deliver a public service, which is how PPP
have been characterised by the European Commission.4
But even this description of the features does not cover
all the different options. There are several different models
of financing and asset ownership. Concessions are also
characterised by the European Commission5 as a form of
PPP, so that the term can also be used to describe the
exploitation by a private sector supplier of a right to provide
a service where payments are made directly by the public
as customer, payments which may or may not be partly
subsidised by the public entity.
Why is it important to understand PPP now?
Transactions which might now be called PPP existed before
the term came into common use in the 1990s. But there are
three main reasons why, more than ever, it is now important
that policy makers and those responsible for public service
delivery understand PPP.
Firstly, PPP is a dynamic field of activity. The high level
of PPP activity across Europe shows no sign of slowing
down. The UK, Ireland, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal
already have high levels of activity in different sectors and
other Member States are following.
There are strong pressures both in old and new EU
Member States driving public authorities to use PPP as a
means of delivering public services. These include budgetary
pressures (in or out of the Euro zone) leading to the need for
cost reduction, the pursuit of better revenue collection and
limitations on resources available for public financing of
infrastructure investment, as well as pressures from citizens
as consumers with ever higher service expectations. In some
cases public entities seek also to use PPP as a way of
introducing private sector management skills for different
methods of service delivery and to use public assets more
effectively. As a result, PPP is being used for an ever wider
range of public services.
Secondly, because PPP is a dynamic field of activity,
there is also a need now to try to understand medium- and
long-term political and economic effects as a means of
public service delivery, i.e. the implications for public
service delivery of the wider use of the private sector as a
service deliverer. In most sectors and Member States, most
public services are still delivered directly by the public
sector, so any conclusions must by definition be provisional.
But two developments can be observed where there has
already been significant use of the private sector for service
delivery.
• Where the public sector has withdrawn completely as a
service provider there can be difficulties for public
entities to regulate the sector effectively. This has been
observed in the provision of long-term residential and
nursing care for the elderly, chronically ill and physically
disabled in the UK, where municipalities are now
heavily dependent on the private sector for the provision
of this care.6
• Market liberalisation has led to consolidation amongst
potential private sector providers, for example within the
EU in the water, energy and solid waste management
sectors. This could make it difficulty for public entities to
ensure continuing effective competition for individual
contracts, especially when a high level of activity allows the
private sector to select which opportunities it responds to.
It is too soon to say whether or not there ought generally
to be concerns about the value for money of PPP in the long
term. This has been demonstrated by the uncertainty of   the
UK National Audit Office in some high profile cases such
as the London Underground PPP.7 Very few PPP have gone
the full course of their life. But those who claim that PPP have
already delivered value for money savings are by definition
basing their claims on savings foreseen in PPP transactions
negotiated and/or savings claimed to have been achieved
during the project construction phase.8 A more useful
assessment of value for money for a public entity can in
reality only be made over the whole life of the transaction.
Thirdly, there is a risk that insufficient legal certainty may
impact in future on PPP transactions, This is particularly
important to the supplier market in the type of long-term
high-value contracts which PPP often involves.
It is possible to identify two main sources for this
potential risk.
• PPP are a form of public procurement. So the new Public
Procurement Directive,9 due to be transposed into
national law in EU Member States by 31 January 2006,
generally applies to PPP. But the complexity of an
increasing number of PPP mean that they do not fit very
comfortably with the different definitions and different
treatments in the new Directive on public contracts,
works concessions and service concessions. The
Commission has highlighted the fact that in some
transactions it has not been easy at the start of an award
process to be sure whether they are a public contract or
a concession, and that the initial definition might change
as a result of negotiations.10 In the new Directive works
concessions are less regulated than public works
contracts, while service concessions remain entirely
outside the scope of the Directive and are governed only
by the need to apply EU Treaty principles.
• The new Directive introduced measures designed to
make the use of PPP easier ie a new contract award
procedure known as Competitive Dialogue.11 It is meant
to allow a public entity which knows what outcome it
wants to achieve but not how best to achieve it to discuss,
in confidence, possible solutions in the dialogue phase
of the tender process with short-listed bidders before
calling for final bids.
Competitive Dialogue is intended to be used more
frequently and be easier to justify than the negotiated
procedure in the existing Directive. It will be able to be used
for “particularly complex contracts” where a Contracting
Authority considers12 that use of the open or restricted
procedures (requiring pre-determined specifications) will
not allow the award of the contract. Unlike the negotiated
procedure (the award procedure generally used now in
such situations), it is not necessarily to be used only
exceptionally. The Directive envisages that the Competitive
Dialogue procedure could, for example, be used to award
contracts for integrated transport infrastructure projects or
large IT projects or with complex financial and legal
structures which cannot be determined in advance of the
tender process.
The European Commission believes13 that the Com-
petitive Dialogue procedure, clearly giving public bodies
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the freedom to negotiate the technical, legal and financial
aspects of public contracts, is particularly well adapted to
PPP and will provide the necessary legal certainty so
important to confidence in long-term PPP-type contracts.
This contrasts with the narrower view taken by the
Commission about the permissible uses of the negotiated
procedure, namely that it applies principally to technical
aspects of the contract and not, strictly, to legal and
financial aspects.14
But suppliers have some concerns15 about how the
procedure will work in practice:
• whether in reality the confidentiality of bids enshrined in
the new Directive will actually be protected in the
dialogue phase of the process;
• whether the dialogue phase of the process will be conducted
in a manner consistent with the principles of equal
treatment, non-discrimination and transparency, espe-
cially if there is more than one stage to the dialogue;
• how lenders, whose
needs often lead to sig-
nificant changes to
projects at a late stage,
will regard this pro-
cess, in which nego-
tiations are not per-
mitted after the selec-
tion of the most eco-
nomically advantage-
ous tender. This could
lead in practice to
public entities seeking
to stretch the limit of
the meaning of
clarification of tenders
or confirmation of commitments included in the tender,
both of which the new Directive does permit.
What needs to be done to make the use of PPP
more effective?
The above analysis highlights the significant operational
and legal challenges facing public entities seeking to use
PPP as a means of public service delivery, and the possible
responses fall naturally into the same categories.
There are a number of operational strategies which can
be deployed to make the use of PPP more effective.
Firstly, because of the high level of activity, Member
States need a mechanism to allow themselves to step back
from individual projects and look at the medium and long
term effect of PPP on public service delivery. Since there are
relatively few examples so far of PPP schemes which have
completed all of their design, construction and operational
phases, continuing interim assessment is needed. Are
there, for example, any services in which PPP is working
notably better or worse than elsewhere? Is risk transfer truly
effective in all services? Are PPP consistently delivering
better performance in all services? Is there a difference
between the value for money at the design and construction
phase and in the operational phase? As PPP markets
mature, do suppliers and public entities expect profit
margins be higher or lower in future? Will PPP be used for
more services, less services or different services in future?
Is there a level of private sector provision beyond which
public entities lose control of the means to effectively
regulate service provision? Will there be more competition
or less competition for individual contracts in future?
The answers, and the means used to reach them, will
almost certainly be different in different Member States. But
it is hard to argue that such a review process should not be
undertaken by some entity in each Member State.
Secondly, at the level of the individual public entity,
there needs to be a mechanism for confirming that PPP is
the most appropriate solution in each particular project.
PPP is not – or should not be seen as – the default option.
To regard it as such can lead to the risk of weakening the
bargaining position of public entities with suppliers, possible
over-dependence of a public entity on the private sector for
service delivery and/or stretching the capacity of the market
to supply public sector needs.
Thirdly, there needs to be a mechanism to ensure that
the lessons of PPP award processes and delivery are being
learned to improve future PPP. For example, PPP models
are continuing to evolve; using standard contract docu-
mentation as a baseline
for customisation is one
important way to learn
lessons from experience
and avoid reinventing the
wheel. In the UK, contract
clauses on benefit sharing
for the public sector,
where there is debt
refinancing by the
provider, is one area
where this has helped.
Further, there are a
range of difficult issues
emerging in the award
process and
implementation of PPP which need to be dealt with effectively.
There is, for example, a continuing need to ensure:
• that encirclement of public entities by suppliers
(relationship-building by suppliers before major award
processes which influence the outcome of the
procurement) is effectively controlled;
• that there is true risk transfer from public entities to
suppliers in return for profits and no unplanned transfer
back of risk;
• that public entities allocate appropriate resources for
contract management and market regulation;
• that contract variations and break points in long term
contracts are dealt with in a way which avoids unduly
increasing the profitability of a PPP above what was
envisaged at the time of contract award, except where
this is justified by a change in risks accepted by the
supplier;
• that public sector service “corporate memory” is
maintained so that contracts can be terminated if
supplier performance is unsatisfactory. This is crucial to
avoiding contract lock-in and allowing public entities to
take back a service in-house or to switch suppliers;
• that the basis for calculation of payments to and from
the supplier on premature contract termination in different
situations is clearly stated and does not form a barrier
to contract termination by a public entity where this is
necessary;
• that a change of supplier ownership, especially through
secondary markets in PPP consortium stakes, is not
harmful to service delivery.
Member States need to
step back from individual
PPP projects and make
sure that they look at the
overall effect of PPP on
public service delivery in
the medium term.
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Competitive Dialogue procedures, public entities seeking
to attract competitive bids for a PPP need to be aware of the
level of care needed to manage the process. They will have
to address supplier concerns seriously to show that they are
competent and reliable and genuinely seeking to treat all
bidders equally. There will now need to be a clear three-
stage structure for the award of complex contracts, which
has not always been the case in the past:
• a short-listing phase, in which suitable tenderers are
selected who meet the minimum eligibility standards for
financial, economic and technical criteria;
• a dialogue phase with tenderers where alternative
solutions are discussed;
• a final tender phase during which fine tuning, further
specification and clarification are permitted provided
that they do not change the basic features of the tenders
or the contract’s key terms. Further clarification of the
winning tender and/or confirmation of commitments in
it can then be sought if required.
In the existing negotiated procedure there is no obligation
after short-listing for the process to follow any particular
structure for the negotia-
tions. Though many public
entities have in practice
set out a clear structure
and timetable in advance
and fixed the key elements
of the specification and
contract conditions in a
competitive environment,
the need is now clearer
because of the restrictions
on negotiations after the
final tender is submitted.
The use of the Competitive
Dialogue procedure could
thus have the effect of un-
derpinning existing good
practice in PPP – that
selection of the preferred bidder should not happen until all
substantial terms and conditions affecting the price and
delivery of the scheme are settled while there is still
competition.
In addition there will also be a need, specifically,
for:
• a commitment within the public entity, early in the
dialogue phase, to invest time and resources in under-
standing the potential solutions likely to be proposed by
the bidders (strengths and weaknesses, outcomes and
performance standards for those solutions, potential
deal breakers etc.);
• a clear and transparent timetable and structure for
information flows between bidders and the public entity
and assessment of solutions in the dialogue phase;
• a clear code of practice for conduct of the dialogue
phase, for example, clearly identifying what is confidential
and non-confidential data, setting out how confidentiality
of data will be preserved (transmission, storage, access
etc.) and how equality of treatment for each bidder in
the dialogue will be achieved (frequency, scope, con-
duct, recording of meetings etc..);
• internal guidance notes within the public entity (prepared
before the final tenders are submitted) about how the
evaluation criteria will be applied to different solutions
at final tender stage.
As regards legal issues, the key question centres around
whether or not different treatments for PPP which are public
contracts and those which are classified in the Directive as
concessions can continue to be justified. There is a clear risk
that diversity of practice and lack of co-ordination of
national legislation in the award of PPP in EU Member
States could act as a barrier to competition, to the ability of
public authorities to procure infrastructure development as
quickly as they want to, and to the development of the
public procurement component of the EU Internal Market.
This is significant, given that the Commission has already
highlighted public procurement as an area lagging behind
in implementation of the Internal Market.16 In addition,
challenge on the grounds of using the wrong award
procedure (and thus the uncertainty of legal outcome) is a
greater risk given the increasing number of cases dealt with
in the field of public procurement by the European Court of
Justice.17
But, having developed the analysis, the Commission
concluded in the Communication18 that there was “signi-
ficant stakeholder opposi-
tion to a regulatory regime
covering all contractual
PPPs” (public contracts
and concessions) and
therefore “the Commis-
sion does not envisage
making them subject to
identical award arrange-
ments”.
Elsewhere in the Com-
munication19 there is a
recognition of the need
for a stable, consistent le-
gal environment for the
award of concessions,
particularly to enhance
competition, that general
EU Treaty principles do not provide enough legal certainty
in the award of concessions and that it is “difficult to
understand why service concessions which are often used
for complex and high value projects are entirely excluded
from EU secondary legislation”.
The author’s view is that the most straightforward way
of bringing about legal certainty in this field is the solution
which the Commission appears to have ruled out, namely
making public contracts and all concessions subject to
identical award arrangements. Nevertheless, if a new
legislative initiative includes, as the Commission suggests
in the Communication that it might,20 both works and
services concessions this would at least reduce the scope for
avoidance of the aim of the initiative, to promote competition.
Two key conclusions can be drawn as regards the legal
issues relevant to PPP.
Firstly, while there is no concrete evidence so far that
legal uncertainty is having a significant impact on the pace
of growth of PPP, the nature of the issues highlighted above
means that it has the potential to do so in the future.
Secondly, Competitive Dialogue has the potential to
enable public entities to enhance their procurement
procedures, combining the disciplines it requires with
existing best practice in the negotiated procedure. This
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The clearest way of
increasing legal certainty
about the award of PPP
and concessions is to
make all public contracts
and concessions subject
to identical award
arrangements.
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should be helpful for complex PPP. But if it is not applied
with great care there is potential scope for legal challenges.
Hence the urgency for technical guidance on the application
of the Competitive Dialogue procedure, called for by a
substantial number of stakeholders21 in response to the
Commission’s consultation, and promised by the Com-
mission in the Communication.22 ::
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